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D’Arcy McNickle’s novel Wind from an Enemy Sky (1978) begins : “The
Indian named Bull and his grandson took a walk into the mountains to
look at a dam built in a cleft of rock, and what began as a walk became
a journey into the world” (1995, 1). 1 As with most journeys, and as dis-
tinct from wanderings and well -practiced travels to fami liar places, the
journey portrayed by McNickle depends upon maps of various kinds to
chart and negotiate unknown territory. In the novel, McNickle describe s
“maps of the mind” that provide strategies for comprehending and nego-
tiating the world, often in vastly different ways . Specifically, in Wind,
these are conceptual maps shaped by cultural hist ories and experiences ,
and they determine the dynamics of intercultural encounters, the focu s
of the story. We will argue that even as McNickle presents a chronicle
of contact and communication between Native American and European
American people, he offers a theoretical assessment of the different
kinds of mapping used at these points of contact and their consequences.
McNickle’s narrative centers on the issues of colonialism, Native
American identity, self-determination, and cultural survival . Alternative
ways of mapping the world both create and provide resolutions to these
problems. Historically, maps have been essential resources in the
process of colonialism; knowing indigenous people meant mapping
them in locations relative to the colonizers . With maps came the possi-
bili ty of exploitation, dispossession, and assimilation. McNickle’s use
of maps as metaphors evokes this violent history. But even as these con-
tending colonial maps lead to tragedy, the story dramatically propose s
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an anticolonial approach to mapping that is grounded in Native American thought
and committed to cultural continuity rather than destruction .
McNickle presents at least three kinds of mapping in the course of the novel .
The first attempts to provide a totalizing and static portrait of the world, sub-
suming all diversity into a single epistemological framework. The second more
modestly tries to map Indi an Country alone, in isolation from the colonizing
Europe an American culture, and it defines Nativeness solely in terms of its dif-
ference from European America. Both maps, however, are colonial because they
assume the power to define Native people from outside, usua lly as unchanging
and inferior to Europe an Americans, and to govern them. These two maps ,
McNickle argues throughout the story, undermine the possibi lity of Native sov-
ereignty and, thus, Native cultural survival despite the sometimes benevolen t
intentions of those who use them . A key to understanding both the structure and
problems of these colonial maps is found in twentieth-century Anglo-Ame rican
philosophy, specifically in Bertrand Russell’s analysis of the limitations of logic
and knowledge . Like McNickle, Russell challenges the possibility of tota lizing
maps and identities . Instead, he adopts a more modest alternative that parallel s
McNickle’s second map, displaying both its strengths and its weaknesses . In
the novel, McNickle shows the failures of this map as well and proposes a third
alternative that is both functional and flexible, one aimed at finding means to
specific ends rather than envisioning a comprehensive portrait of the world . Thi s
map rejects the colonial power to define and to govern from outside in favor of
the ability to make and use nontotalizing maps within a local, changing contex t
as a means of cultural surv ival and self-determination . McNickle’s conception
of maps and their purposes is critically import ant because of its implication s
both for philosophy and for anticolonial movements . Wind from an Enemy Sky ,
as we read it, thus presents an examination of these contending approaches t o
mapping—of ways of comprehending and negotiating the world—alive in twen-
tieth-century philosophy. However, McNickle extends conventional philosoph-
ical analysis by showing the concrete and often colonial effects of particular
ways of knowing the world . As a result, he points out, those who would suc-
cessfully resist colonial domination must understand its logic in order to avoi d
repeating its patte rns.
* * *
Wind from an Enemy Sky begins with two tragic events that relate to the dynam-
ics of colonialism in the novel . It is the nature of these events, and various char-
acters’ reactions to them, that reveals the three con flicting “maps of the mind”
that manifest themselves in the actions that drive the narrative. As one character
observes, these different maps are a crucial source of the political and cultural
conflicts in the story : “The problem is communication. . . . The answer, obviously,
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is that we do not speak to each other—and language is only p art of it . Perhaps it
is intention, or purpose, the map of the mind we follow” (1995, 125) . The novel
presents a portrait of these va rious maps and illustrates their concrete conse-
quences . For McNickle, ways of seeing the world are never purely abstract.
Rather, they are always linked to lived events, and at times in the story these
events are devastating .
Set in the 1930s, the novel opens with the (fictional) Little Elk tribe’s dis-
covery of a cataclysm : the construction of a dam by white developers floods a
lush valley on former tribal l and, long known by the Little Elk people to be a
“place of power”—a sacred place, in other words, which had long played an
important role in the culture of the tribe and thus commanded care and respect .
The very existence of the dam, then, violated Little Elk belief systems . But i t
carried other implications as well . McNickle likely drew inspiration for this scene
from actual events that occurred around the time he beg an the novel,2 the dam-
building enterpri ses on Indian res ervations characteri stic of the development proj -
ects of the Roosevelt era. “Progress,” readers soon learn, had similarly compelled
the construction of the Little Elk dam, which div erted water to farm lands owned
by white homesteaders . As the story unfolds, links between colonial history and
this present catastrophe become increasingly clear . These homesteaders had
gained title to Indi an lands as a consequence of the General Allotment Act of
1887, a policy that defied treaty obligations and divided reservation land into
individual allotments . Characteristic of the colonial efforts of the United State s
to transform Natives into “civilized” Americans, the Act effectively shattered tra-
ditional social structures and attempted to transform Natives from communal
occup ants of collective property into individual farmers, that is, to acclimate a
“primitive” people into a “higher” stage of development as propertied farmers.3
The Act obviously benefited non-native people . Once tribal members had
received the requisite land, the gove rnment (represented by the local Indian
agent) opened vast tracts of “surplus” reservation land (often the choicest parcels)
to white settlement. In the novel, the Little Elk dam, which supplies these home-
steaders with water for irrigation while drying up the Indians’ water sources, i s
merely the latest in a se ries of approp riations of Native resources and attacks on
traditional ways of life. The building of the dam also reflects on the Little Elk
people’s current situation . Confined to the reservation and under the control of
a host of colonial officials, their inability to resist the building of the dam —
indeed, their virtual lack of knowledge of its existence until it was too late —
points to the overall powerlessness of the tribe in the colonial era . The conflicts
embedded in this event are at the crux of the novel . What, exactly, are the mech-
anisms of colonialism? What logic do they follow? And, ultimately, McNickle
asks, how can we escape them?
The logic of these p articular events is the product of the first map of the mind
in the novel, the map that presents all of the world in a single picture with Europe
and things European at its center. In McNickle’s story, following a map that
defines the Little Elk as inferior to European-derived ideals of “civilization,”
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government agents attempt to replace Native ways with European American cul-
ture—in other words, to make “them” like “us .” Efforts to undermine traditional
practices and promote economic development, as well as aggressive educational
programs, all pivoted on the expectation that differences apparent in Native peo -
ple could be understood in terms of a universal conception of human nature, a
map against which aspects of Native culture could be measured . Different prac-
tices could and should be eliminated, or at least moderated. Historically, thi s
process of annihilating Native differences rendered possible and “justified” th e
appropriation of Native land and other resources . The entire project, however ,
depended finally on a central logic that imagined it had the ability to compre-
hend successfully the world on its own terms and thus to command conformity .
The problem faced by this colonial “map of the mind” in the context o f
McNickle’s novel—its failure to recognize and engage difference—points to th e
integral relationship between epistemological and colonial practices and paral-
lels a central problem in twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy : the
problem of completeness and the paradoxes of self-reference .
Even as McNickle recognized the problem of colonial maps in his work i n
the 1930s, Russell had previously explored a central problem of their logic i n
1902, and his insight became a turning point in the history of European an d
American philosophy. Rather than being simply an abstract concern for philoso -
phers of mathematics and logic, the problem reflects on McNickle’s analysis of
alternative approaches to mapping by calling into question what and how w e
know. Inspired by early developments in the philosophy of mathematics, Russell
had set out to propose his own complete formulation of the principles of math-
ematics. By 1902, he was well along in what he thought would be the definitiv e
work on the philosophy of mathematical logic when he came across a problem .
As he reports it, the problem emerged as he tried to work out the implications of
Cantor’s proof that there can be no greatest cardinal number (Russell 1903, 101) .
The proof turned on the conclusion that for any given number, there is always a
greater one . If this is true for numbers, Russell worried, a similar principle might
lead to a contradiction in attempts to formalize completely mathematics through
set theory. According to the general set theory Russell was using, sets can be
formed by objects that share any well-defined property so that, for example, mul -
tiples of 2 and multiples of 19 constitute sets . Sets can contain other sets, as in
the case of the set containing two sets, the set of even numbers and the set of odd
numbers. One possible set containing other sets is the one that contains all an d
only those sets whose members do not include themselves . For instance, the se t
of all human beings does not contain itself since it contains only human being s
and no sets at all . Sets that do not contain themselves as members are calle d
impredicative sets .
The problem emerges when we ask whether this set containing all and onl y
impredicative sets also includes itself . If it does not contain itself, then, of course,
it is an impredicative set and so, in blatant contradiction, must contain itself . Bu t
if it does contain itself, then it cannot be an impredicative set . It follows from
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the contradiction that the set containing all and only impredicative sets is not
itself impredicative . And if it is not impredicative, then by definition it does con -
tain itself and so, since all sets it contains are impredicative, must be impred-
icative after all . Both answers led to contradiction and so something was very
definitively wrong. If set theory is necessary to formali ze ari thmetic, but the rules
of set theory lead inevitably to contradiction, then attempts to “know” math b y
giving all of its rules were in trouble. Despite the apparent insignificance of th e
problematic case, that is, an unlikely set in the midst of an otherwise useful the-
ory, the disaster for philosophy of logic, mathematics, and epistemology was
enormous . Unless principles could be found to eliminate the contradiction ,
Russell concluded, all general accounts of deduction become impossible
(1956, 64) .
For philosophers made confident by the successes of science and the weak-
ening hold of doctrinal religion on academic philosophy, Russell’s parado x
became a crucial problem. For philosophers like Gottlob Frege, the process o f
completely mapping arithmetic through formal principles was simply part of the
general expectation that comprehensive knowledge of the world was at least pos -
sible, if not likely.4 To find what seemed to be an inherent limitation at the very
center of so basic a project threatened the logic that suppo rted human knowl-
edge. When Frege learned of the paradox in a letter from Russell, he replied ,
“Arithmetic totters” (qtd . in Quine 1976b, 11) and eventually gave up what he
had expected to be a final formulation of the foundations of arithmetic . The logic
of Frege’s effort is instructive because his project was in a crucial way an abstract
version of the process of mapping illustrated in Wind from an Enemy Sky that
attempts to present a fixed and complete picture of the entire world, includin g
the relationship between Native America and Europ ean America . Just as Frege’s
theoretical effort failed of its own logic, McNickle argues, its lived version at the
intersection of Native and non-Native worlds must necessari ly fail as well.
In McNickle’s novel, most of the European American characters share a com-
mitment to a kind of Fregean mapping of the world—complete and final—where
Native people are forever “savages” and Europe ans are forever the universal
“ideal .” Following this map and thus convinced of the necessity of their ow n
dominance, these characters wreak destruction on Native people and their land.
Appropriating the l and and diverting the water is only part of the problem. The
colonizers also convert Little Elk land into farms, disempower their leaders and
replace them with U.S . government officials, and educate their children in white
ways. McNickle evokes here the motto of General Richard Henry Pratt, master -
mind of the boarding school policy designed to assimilate Native children : “Kill
the Indian and save the man.” The building of the dam provides a c ritical exam-
ple of this process. For the Little Elk people, the place where the dam had bee n
built was a “holy place,” a “place of power” to be respected . “Be careful what
you think . . . . Keep your thoughts good. . . . Don’t have angry thoughts here”
(1995, 5–6), the Little Elk people instructed their children . The European
Americans, however, saw the place in terms that reduced it to a convenient
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resource for white ranchers . Whatever the Little Elks might have thought abou t
it, their alternative meanings and purposes could only be superstitions and myth s
supervening on an otherwise profitable topography. For McNickle, the particu-
lar illustrates the general . Over and over again in colonial history, in advancing
their own goals in the name of universal progress, European Americans heed-
lessly disregarded and destroyed aspects of Native Americans’ physical and cul -
tural worlds . In the novel, the death and destruction that stem from this colonia l
map of the mind both generate the lived contradictions of the logic of colonial -
ism and show the potential of the Native alternative .
The construction of the dam leads inevitably to the second tragic event in the
novel : the killing of Jimmy Cooke, a maintenance worker at the dam . This event
demonstrates the consequences of the first map of the mind and its utter failure
to comprehend difference. It is Pock Face, a young man of the Little Elk tribe ,
who travels to the dam and shoots Cooke after observing the turmoil brought t o
the tribe by the building of the dam . The shooting brings the two cultures into
immediate and violent conflict. Mistakenly confident in his own ability to under -
stand the situation and oblivious to Little Elk perspectives, the local sheriff, Si d
Grant, relentlessly persecutes the entire tribe for the murder . His power testifies
to the government’s ability to impose its own system of justice while excluding
the Indians’ markedly different beliefs and practices. For the Little Elk people ,
Cooke’s murder is not a murder at all : “Killing the water” (by building the dam )
was “an unnatural disruption of a functioning universe, a kind of crime agains t
life” (1995, 210), an act meriting retaliation . Nonetheless, the entire tribe under-
goes a series of ordeals at the hands of the sheriff, as well as the Indian agent ,
Toby Rafferty, as the state seeks to prosecute Cooke’s killer .
Despite his association with Sid Grant in prosecuting the murder of Cooke ,
Rafferty in fact embodies the second map of the mind in McNickle’s story . He
is presented as a European American different from both Grant and Rafferty’ s
predecessors in the office of Indian Agent. As McNickle describes him, he is “a
new man in Indian affairs” and his appointment “was announced as a repudia-
tion of the military-political-missionary tradition that had prevailed in the past ”
(33) .5 As part of the reform movement, Rafferty recognizes (to a limited degree,
at least) the humanity of the Little Elk people and the value of some of their tra-
ditional practices . Also, like most reformers, he professes genuine sympathy for
Native peoples and their plight . In the story, he continually mediates betwee n
Sheriff Grant (who practices the old, combative style of dealing with Indians)
and the Little Elks, attempting to ease for them the ordeal of the murder inves-
tigation. He also develops a great affection for some of the tribe’s members .
However, a kind of paradox emerges in Rafferty’s behavior, one that resonate s
with the contradictions inherent in the reform movement. Was this “new” style,
McNickle queries, really so different from the old one?
This contradiction in Rafferty’s treatment of the Little Elks becomes mani-
fest in an encounter early in the novel when the agent confronts a dilemma :
whether or not to help the Indians find and return a medicine bundle, a traditional
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object of spiritual power that a member of the tribe had surrendered to a mis-
sionary years before . Baffled, Rafferty consults Doc Edwards, the agency physi-
cian, about what he should do : “You can’t answer these things right off,” Rafferty
explains, “What is it? How important is it? What happens if it comes back? D o
we scrap all our ideas about improving their way of living, let them do a flip-
flop back to the past?” The agent’s response to the request is revealing : patron-
izingly, he believes that it is he, Rafferty, rather than the Indians, who shoul d
decide what is best for the Little Elk people . Edwards, by contrast, urges the
agent to rely on the Indians’ own judgment : “Old Henry asked you something
he considers important. After all these years of doing what the white man sai d
was important, you have to stop and try to figure out whether he knows what he’s
doing. Don’t you suppose he’s already done a lot of thinking about it?”
Appearing, however briefly, to recognize the problems inherent in his own posi-
tion of authority, Rafferty responds : “If these people don’t need what a white
man has to offer, then we should all get out” (37–38). But the agent doesn’t “get
out.” Ultimately, he takes up the Indians’ cause and aids in their quest for the
bundle, but his initial reticence reflects attitudes that carry through the rest of th e
story. Throughout the novel, he otherwise acts the part of the Indian agent, mak -
ing on behalf of the government key decisions that affect the Little Elk peoples ’
lives and encouraging them to work toward their own “self-improvement” (i .e. ,
assimilation). He presses them, for example, to take up farming, an integral part
of the assimilation policies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century .
However sympathetic toward the Indians Rafferty may be, his exercise of power
remains ensconced in the dynamics of colonial power he seeks to reject .
Rafferty’s position parallels the workings of government policies during th e
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the years leading up to and includ-
ing the reformist era that provide the novel’s historical context. Even as the gov-
ernment tried to instill individualism in Native communities through the 188 7
Allotment Act, the effort in practice disempowered and fragmented entire com-
munities . As the Meriam report (1928), which helped to establish the refor m
movement, explained it, “It almost seemed as if the government assumed that
some magic in individual ownership would in itself prove an educational civi-
lizing factor, but unfortunately this policy has for the most part operated in th e
opposite direction” (qtd. in McNickle 1973, 92) . The reform movement of which
Rafferty was a part rejected the old perspective and committed to the view tha t
“freedom of choice is an essential ingredient of a democratic society, a freedom
that cannot be exercised unless true alternatives are available” (93) . As a result ,
Rafferty and those like him adopted a “task to help Indians meet the myriads of
complex, interrelated, mutually dependent situations which develop among them ,
according to the very best light [the reformers] could get on those happenings”
(Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, qtd . in McNickle 1973, 93) . But
because individualism, private property, and democracy were inimical to most
traditional social structures, these efforts in the end proved destructive to com-
munities already shattered by colonialism. Whatever their intentions, the reform-
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ers’ commitment to “helping” Natives by forcing values upon them further
demoralized a dispossessed people struggling to survive centuries of genocide .
What was missing was the Native voice, the power of Native peoples to make
determinations about their own lives from within their communities .
Marking a distinct parallel between McNickle’s narrative and the philosoph-
ical issues raised by the limitations of formal systems, Rafferty tries to carry out
in practice the kind of radical revision of the old logic undertaken theoretically
by Russell in light of the paradox he discovered . Not long after he published hi s
findings, Russell determined that the problem was one of a range of paradoxe s
stemming from self-reference . In 1908, Russell himself reviewed the various ver -
sions of the problem identified after the initial publication of his set theoretic
version in 1903 . 6 Taken together, all of the versions shared a common element
of self-reference . Specifically, the problem with impredicative sets is the resul t
of rules that allow sets to refer to themselves . When the question arises as to
whether or not a set of impredicative sets is itself impredicative, a contradictio n
follows easily.
Behind the paradox, Russell concluded, is a problem of mapping, that is, a
problem of how one set of ordered relations is mapped onto another. When the
mapping includes a totality, that is, all the relations including those involved i n
the mapping itself, a paradox emerges . Russell illustrates this close connection
between the problems of the paradox and the relations of mapping in his 191 9
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy . Here the problem of self-reference i s
introduced through an example he attributes to Josiah Royce :
One of the most striking instances of reflexion is Royce’s illustration of the
map: he imagines it decided to make a map of England upon a part of the sur -
face of England. A map, if it is accurate, has a perfect one-one corresponden ce
with its original ; thus our map, which is part, is in one-one relation with the
whole, an d must contain the same number of points as the whole, which must
the refore be a reflexive number. Royce is interested in the fact that the map, if
it is correct, must contain a map of the map, which must in tu rn contain a map
of the map of the map, and so on ad infinitum. (80 )
Cantor’s proof that there is no greatest cardinal number is the abstract analogu e
of Royce’s mapping case. As Quine summarizes, Cantor’s theorem establishe s
that for every class, even every infinite class, there is a larger class : the class of
its subclasses (1976b, 15) . In the mapping case, if the class in question is som e
territory to be mapped, its subclasses will include at least all of the things in th e
territory to be mapped and all of the corresponding elements of the map. So far,
there is no paradox . However, as Quine observes, when the class in questio n
includes everything, then a version of Russell’s paradox follows directly (15) . In
this case, if everything includes the map and its territory, Cantor’s theorem leads
to the inevitable conclusion that, in addition to the map and its territory, ther e
must be a still larger class that permits a still larger map, including, in effect,
276
	
SHARI M . HUHNDORF, SCOTT L. PRATT
more than everything . As Russell put it following an unnamed Chinese philoso-
pher, “[A] dun cow and a bay horse makes three things : separately they are each
one and taken together they are another, therefore they are three” (1956, 260) . If
we expected a map to be accurate in the sense Royce suggests, we now kno w
that it cannot be . Even if we expand the class of the map and its territory t o
include the map, its territory, and its connection (a map of the map and its terri-
tory), the problem begins again with the demand for still another map to encom-
pass the new map and its object . In short, the very nature of mapping seems to
guarantee that an accurate map of any totality will be impossible so long as th e
map is included in what is being mapped .
The consequence of this abstract critique is, as Russell recognized, a concret e
limitation on mathematical logic and, by extension, on how human beings know
the world. Apparently, the very nature of the process of mapping is such tha t
when completeness is demanded, it cannot logically be achieved . Russell rec-
ognized the significance of the problem (though perhaps not its social conse-
quences) and spent much of his long career attempting to solve it . Most of hi s
attempts to do so followed the approach he took in a 1908 paper, “Mathematica l
Logic as Based on the Theory of Types .” What is common to all of the paradoxe s
of self-reference, he argues there, is the common assumption of a totality suc h
that, if it were legitimate, it would at once be enlarged by new members define d
in terms of itself (1956, 63) . In each case, the paradox is generated by an unre-
stricted notion of all : for Russell’s and Cantor’s paradoxes, the issue is an unre-
stricted reference to all sets ; for the map paradox, everything in a certai n
geographic region. In order to avoid such paradoxes, Russell concluded that the
objects of explanatory propositions must have definite boundaries so that any-
thing that involves the object as a whole is not itself included in it. He expressed
this conclusion as a rule : “Whatever involves all of a collection must not be on e
of the collection.” The rule, which he calls the vicious-circle principle, is als o
expressed in the following manner : “[N]o totality can contain members defined
in terms of itself” (63, 75) . In short, the paradoxes in question can be defused b y
excluding the cases that generate them . Russell’s paradox is prevented by declar-
ing the set of all and only impredicative sets as illegitimate according to the
vicious-circle principle . The map paradox is prevented by declaring meaning -
less the idea that a map can be enclosed in its territory and still be accurate . While
the technical implications of Russell’s conclusion lead to his theory of types, th e
more general implications are that attempts to arrive at complete accounts o f
aspects of the world must be pursued in ways that are nonreflexive. Accounts of
the world will necessarily leave out self-reference, and the best point of view
from which to construct any complete map will necessarily be outside the terri-
tory to be mapped .
Russell’s solution implies the second kind of map, which recognizes the lim-
its of the attempt to map everything but retains, in a crucial way, the power t o
map some things outside of itself completely . In Wind from an Enemy Sky ,
Rafferty’s position follows this second map of the mind. From his office at the
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agency, Rafferty looks out upon Native America, however benevolently, from a
position outside of it, a position that thus articulates colonial power . His aspira-
tions to “aid” Native peoples by helping them to assimilate depend upon the mis-
guided notion that he is in the best position to understand the Indians and decid e
what is best for them . Even though he rejects the first map, which assimilate s
Native peoples into a single progressive humanity regardless of the Native per-
spective, he accepts the more limited view that the Little Elk can be known an d
governed from a perspective outside the tribe . Thus, Rafferty rejected one colo-
nial map, yet he retained a key feature of the first colonial map: the view that
Native people themselves are not in a position to determine and respond to thei r
own problems. As McNickle put it in a 1966 article, under the reform movement ,
the government made little effort to listen to Native concerns : “The complaints
were real, but they conveyed no sense of an ‘Indian’ dialectic of involvement i n
their own fate” (276) .
In this way, Rafferty’s position resonates with Russell’s response to the para-
doxes. Despite its problems, the revisionary element of this response should no t
be understated . Even as attempts at totalizing theories, such as those propose d
by the idealists of Russell’s time, became increasingly suspect, the implications
of what Russell learned from the paradoxes become a part of what constitute d
the acceptable background for new theories of logic, science, and knowledge . 7
In light of Russell’s findings, philosophers such as Quine came to conclude tha t
we must expect to find not grand unifying theories, but rather limited account s
that address particular regions of the world . And, yet, even as Russell and late r
Quine undermined confidence in comprehensive theories, the resulting point of
view, or better, the resulting approach to mapping implied in the response to the
paradoxes of self-reference had another effect as well. Even as we must set aside
attempts to know or explain everything, our attempts to know something mus t
nevertheless proceed from a vantage point outside what we wish to understand.
While Russell’s denial of totalizing accounts amounts to a kind of anticolonia l
way of thinking about knowledge, it retains a colonial character in that it main-
tains the power to define its objects from the outside without reflecting on its
own position .8
The third map of the mind, which opposes the colonial leanings of the firs t
two maps, originates in McNickle’s novel in traditional Little Elk ways of bein g
in the world . It is different from the first and second maps of the mind in severa l
ways : it renounces any aspirations to comprehend the world in terms of a single
model and, as a result, it eschews the exercise of power, opting instead to engage
difference rather than to annihilate it . It is, more accurately, not a map by itself,
but a process or strategy for making maps that responds to changing circum-
stances. Unlike the first and second maps of the mind, which see the entire world
in relation to an outside perspective, this third map of the mind involves crossin g
cultural borders and acknowledging the right to self-determination . This is most
obvious in the novel in the ways two Indian characters, Son Child (also know n
as The Boy) and Antoine, engage the dominant European American society in
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the story. Son Child is a t ribal member who works at the agency under Rafferty,
and Antoine is the grandson of the Little Elk leader, Bull . Like Rafferty, both
characters attempt to mediate between the tribe and the white world in the dis-
putes over the dam and the murder. Un like Rafferty, though, they are successfu l
in their efforts in part because they unders tand both the Little Elk world and the
European American world from the inside . Both are characters who, out of neces-
sity, have repeatedly traversed the boundaries between cultural worlds . They
attended Indi an boarding schools and, in so doing, learned to underst and the
European American “map of the mind .” At the same time, however, they remain
committed to the welfare of the t ribe as a distinct entity. While Antoine became
fully reintegrated into the Little Elk community after his retu rn from school at
the story’s beginning, Son Child opted to work at the agency under Rafferty .
However, as he proves over and over again, his loyalties lie with the Little El k
people, and his position in the colonial government actually works to their advan-
tage as he repeatedly intervenes on their behalf in the matter of Cooke’s murder.
In the novel, his relationship to the community is critically important . While both
characters learn to negotiate the broader world, they use these skills on behalf o f
the Little Elk tribe. Both Antoine and Son Child are bilingual and both frequently
act as tr anslators in the disputes between their kinsmen and the white world
regarding the dam and Cooke’s death . In this way, Son Child and Antoin e
embody McNickle’s conception of permeable “ethnic boundaries,” developed i n
his treatise Native American Tribalism, which eschews essentialized notions of
Native identities and argues that cultural change is necessary for Native America
to su rvive as a distinct entity (McNickle 1973, esp . chap . 1) .
In Wind, the act of journeying between worlds imparts the wisdom necessary
for the tribe’s surv ival, illustrating McNickle’s conviction that Natives must cul -
tivate the ability to negotiate changes brought about by the dominant culture . 9
Significantly, all of the story’s anticolonial characters repeatedly cross va riou s
cultural or epistemological borders . The wise man and dreamer of the t ribe, aptly
named Two Sleeps (his name, like that of Son Child/The Boy, carries a double
valence signifying his ability to see the world in different ways), had come to
the Little Elks from another tribe. They found him in a death-like state after other
members of his family had been murdered. Throughout the story, it is in the real m
between sleep and waking that Two Sleeps receives his visions and gives guid-
ance to the Little Elk people . Son Child, too, is a character who traverses world s
in multiple ways . Not only does he journey between cultures, but his name als o
links him to the character of Thunderbird, child of the Sun, a figure who is both
mythical and human and whose story occupies an important place in the novel .
Like Son Child, Antoine, whose father is associated with the sun, bears a rela-
tionship to Thunderbird . As the novel relates the story, Thunderbird was born
into the Little Elk t ribe and empowered the Indians to resist their enemies with
his spiritual gifts of tobacco and a medicine bundle. Part of his power derived
from the fact of his hyb ridity, as well as his abi lity to travel between the world
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of the sun and that of earthly beings . McNickle implies that characters like
Thunderbird, characters who can move between worlds, similarly have the power
to help the tribe in the present crisis precipitated by clashing cultures . Unlike
colonialism’s agents, these border-crossers actually participate in the Native and
European American worlds, rather than governing from the outside or otherwise
refusing to engage difference. Unlike colonial maps of the mind, then, this anti-
colonial map is functional rather than essential . Its aim is not to fix the world i n
an image remarkable like its own. Rather, it attempts to engage diversity as a
means of survival and growth, producing multiple images that overlap, interact ,
and change.
Importantly, however, while this third map originates in the Little Elk world ,
in Wind from an Enemy Sky neither hereditary race nor culture completely deter-
mines which map of the mind the characters w ill follow. This point underscore s
McNickle’s insistence that cross-cultural knowledge is essential to effective p olit-
ical resistance . In this case, characters (even colonized subjects) who fail to
understand the logic of coloniali sm are doomed to repeat it. Bull, leader of the
Little Elk tribe, for example, acts in accord with colonial culture’s first map o f
the mind by consistently demonstrating inflexibili ty and epistemological blind-
ness to the difference of Europe an American culture. The nature of Bull’s char-
acter becomes manifest in the novel’s opening pages . If the dam violates the
sacredness of the valley in the opening scene, so, too, does Bull’s violent reac-
tion to the structure. While the site was a place of power, Bull defies the prohi-
bitions surrounding it by immediately becoming enraged upon viewing the da m
and foolishly shooting at the structure . Significantly, at this very moment, he
intuits the nature of its maker, the quintessential colonial figure Adam Pell—th e
engineer, financier, and collector who built the dam—even invoking his nam e
(his refe rence to “first man” points to the Biblical Adam) : “Who is this creature
who built that thing of rock and stopped the water? Is he two-legged like other
men? Or is he a monster first-man, who decides things in his own way?” (1995 ,
7) . But B ull is also a man who “decides things in his own way.” Since the arrival
of white settlers in Little Elk territory, he had refused to engage them in any way.
He had also helped turn the tribe against his own brother, Henry Jim, when Henry
Jim began to adopt white ways. In fact, at the beginning of the novel, it is Bull’ s
inappropriate actions, as much as it is the building of the dam, that lead to the
murder of Jimmy Cooke (who, we lea rn, is Pell’s nephew) . In shooting Cooke ,
Pock Face merely follows in the footsteps of his uncle, imitating his own vio-
lent reactions to the dam’s construction . Born in colonial violence, Bull’s
destructive character, the product of his intolerance for difference, both mim-
ics colonial culture’s hegemonic impulses and testifies to its power to recreate
Indians in its own image .
It is, in part , Bull’s intractability and domineering ways (his adherence, in
other words, to the first map of the mind) that d rive McNickle’s story to its cat-
astrophic conclusion . As the narrative prog resses and both parties begin to come
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to terms with the killing of Cooke, the prospects for refiguring Indian-white rela-
tions appear strong . Times, it seems, have changed. Bull, who had always refused
to engage the white world, begins to trust the Indian agent Rafferty, and indee d
the agent seems genuinely committed to the interests of the Indians. The wedge
driven between the two groups by colonialism’s devastations appears to be dis-
solving when the tribe seeks Rafferty’s aid in recovering the medicine bundle .
Rafferty follows through on his promises to help and traces the bundle to Ada m
Pell’s significantly named Americana Institute . Pell’s role as collector illumi-
nates another critical dimension of his character . His collecting parallels his build-
ing of the dam on Little Elk land : both activities involve appropriating resources
essential to Little Elk life (a crucial aspect of American colonialism) . But his col-
lecting is important in another respect as well . By locating what is valuable i n
Native life in objects from the past, he denies (as does Rafferty) a viable role fo r
Native peoples in the present . In this way, too, he is like Bull : both characters
refuse to recognize and adapt to historical change, a tendency with devastating
results . In fact, when Pell attempts to recover the medicine bundle, which had
been consigned to a lumber room in the museum’s basement, he makes a “mon-
strous discovery.” The language here evokes the history of discovery and con -
quest, and the action points to its terrible consequences . The “battle museum s
wage against rats, moths, [and] organic decay . . . had caught up with the medi-
cine bundle,” leaving it “tattered and profaned, devoid of holy mystery” (1995 ,
210) . This event points to the double logic of colonial culture, which consigns
Native peoples either to a “progressive” present, in which Natives must assimi-
late into colonial culture (and, in so doing, cease being Native), or to an unchang-
ing past (by “museumizing” them, a tendency of both Bull and Pell) . By
metonymically linking the fate of the bundle with that of the tribe, McNickle
alludes to the fate of Native peoples governed by white institutions.
Exhibiting once again his intractable blindness, in an effort to vindicate him-
self for the destruction of the bundle, Pell absurdly decides to replace it with th e
“Virgin of the Andes,” a priceless (in monetary terms) gold figure that had been
for many years the collector’s obsession . Pell had traveled the globe in his ques t
for the figure, ultimately parting with a vast sum to acquire it . This action, which
fails to recognize the culturally specific meanings of different objects, further
embodies and shows the failure of the first map of the mind . Cut off from the
cultural context that gave it meaning, though, “its only present value was as a
piece of merchandise” (213) . The object, in other words, had been “translated”
into a new framework that obliterated its original significance. His behavior here
replicates the workings of colonialism throughout the book, which attempts t o
annihilate difference by universalizing European American ways . Pell’s gift—a
paternalistic gesture—constitutes yet another act of assimilation, an attempt to
bring the Indians into the world of capitalism and “progress .” But there is another
key aspect of Pell’s gift, and herein lies the crux of the catastrophe . In this regard,
its physical features comprise a good part of its significance :
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The modeling of the nude figure w as skillful, combining accurate proportion-
ing with expressive detail. The adolescent body was clearly portrayed—breasts
just swelling, hips just emerging, the vaginal cleft slightly mounded, childis h
plumpness forming into rounded curves—but above the torso was the face o f
a mature woman , staring calmly out of almond-shaped eyes . (213 )
In addition to its newly acquired commodity value, several things about the fig-
ure are important. First, it is the figure of an adolescent, a fact that resonates wit h
colonial culture’s infantilizing of Native peoples (signified in the text by the trans-
lation of the adult Son Child’s name as “The Boy”) . Second, it is the figure of a
female with accentuated sexual features . The male collector’s possession of her
to the exclusion of others (he does not display her, but instead wraps her in blac k
velvet and locks her in a walnut case) thus comprises a sexualized relationshi p
that resonates with the violence and possession of colonial conquest . What Pel l
decides to present to the Little Elk Indians is, in other words, a mirror image of
themselves and their own subjection to colonial power .
Pell’s decision to replace the medicine bundle with the statue is as absurd a s
it is inevitable . To Pell, Indian objects are Indian objects, equivalent elements i n
the conception of humanity that organizes people and culture in terms of their
progress to civilization . Faced with the demand to restore the bundle, Pel l
believes the statue “will do,” that the Little Elk will see no differences because ,
in his mind, there are none. The resulting disaster that follows Pell’s decision i s
the logic of colonialism applied. Just as Frege’s attempt to formalize arithmeti c
failed of its own logic, so Pell’s conception of Native people as part of a singl e
history of humankind was bound to fail of its own efforts and to carry devastat-
ing consequences.
In the novel’s final scene, when the Little Elk people learn of the destructio n
of the medicine bundle and Pell unsuccessfully attempts to give them his gift o f
the gold figure, disaster erupts. This disaster points to the inherent failure of both
colonial approaches to mapping . The Little Elk people revolt at Pell’s concep-
tion of them, and the illusions of the reciprocity and good faith of their relation -
ships with Rafferty shatter. Acting in a response that harks back to the novel’s
beginning, Bull shoots the two colonial agents on the scene, Pell and Rafferty,
killing both men . Bull kills Pell for his attempt to universalize his own worl d
view, which is shown by the construction of the dam and his collecting of Nativ e
culture. But there is another important aspect of this scene : it reveals the destruc-
tive nature of Bull’s character, specifically his failure to adapt to historica l
change, a tendency that parallel’s Pell’s simultaneous attempts to museumize an d
to assimilate Natives . Thus, the suicidal elements of his character, a kind of fatal
self-reference, make him turn to the others left in the circle. As if to admit hi s
failure, Bull then turns to Son Child, awaiting the bullet to the heart he kne w
would come. Just as Pell, the quintessential colonial figure, must die, so too mus t
Bull perish. McNickle’s violent condemnation pictures both a theoretical assess-
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ment of the logic of colonialism and its manifestation in the lives of subjugated
Native peoples. Bull’s and Pell’s behaviors, which show the consequences of the
first map of the mind in McNickle’s novel, are two sides of the same coin, and
both spell death for the Natives .
Rafferty’s death at the hands of Bull similarly marks the failure of the second
map of the mind and its limited attempt to avoid the problems of colonia li sm.
As McNickle’s narrative makes clear, the failure of benevolence and patroniza-
tion is as inevitable as the failure of the map that guided P ell and Bull . Even as
Rafferty struggled to grant value to the Little Elk people and their culture inde-
pendent of their place in human “progress,” he failed to acknowledge their
agency. Ultimately, it is Rafferty who convinces Pell not to t ell the Indians of the
destruction of the medicine bundle, believing to the end that he unders tands the
Little Elk well enough to make decisions on their behalf . In the end, Rafferty
dies for clinging to his status as a powerful outsider and giving no voice to those
he would govern . He dies, in sh ort, because he, like Pell and Bull , cannot break
free of the colonial logic that shapes the relations between Europe an America
and Native America .
But hope is not lost in this final catastrophic scene . The survivors of the shoot-
ing follow McNickle’s third map of the mind, and herein resides the possibility
for resisting colonialism and restoring Native sovereignty. Those who remain on
the scene are Son Child/The Boy, Antoine, and the agency’s European American
physician, Doc Edwards . Significantly, the Little Elk characters Son Child/The
Boy and Antoine are figures who have made the epistemological jou rney Bull
would not (and, perhaps, because of his monocultural experience, could not )
undertake successfully. Unlike Bull , who is mired in the past and unable to adjus t
to a changing world, Son Child and Antoine remain part of the Little Elk com-
munity while incorporating the new skills and creating the relationships that will
enable them to survive in a changing world . Maps for them become a means of
survival, a means of negotiating the unstable boundaries of cultural difference
and historical change . When Pell reveals the fate of the bundle, they are a lready
familiar with the workings of the white world, and so they do not exp erience the
surprise that compels Bull’s destructive action. Another survivor, Doc Edwards ,
provides a model for those non-Natives who would reject the colonial map of
the mind. Unlike Rafferty, Edwards eschews official authority over the Indian s ,
and he relies on the Indians’ judgment in attending to their own affairs (the advice
he gave to Rafferty, but the agent was unwilling to accept) . He thus resists the
logic of the colonial maps and their twin impulses to force Ind ians to assimilate
or to consign them to a timeless and unchanging past. The abi lities to adapt to
change and to engage difference embodied in the anticolonial map of the mind,
McNickle implies, guarantee the survival, not only of cultural diversity, but also
of the inhabitants of both the Europe an and Native worlds .
By contrast, the maps embodied by Bull , Pell , and Rafferty, despite their dif-
ferences, share a common commitment to the kind of mapping that has the power
to fix its objects permanently, in this case, to define Native culture in perpetual
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and fixed opposition to European America . All three die in part because they are
each incompatible with survival and self-determination. The survivors and the
processes of mapping they embody stand as an alternative way of engaging th e
world, not because they are more powerful, but because they give up the power
to define and govern Native people . Rather, as border-crossers, they continuall y
challenge the fixed nature of and relations between cultures pictured by thes e
colonial maps . At the same time, however, they maintain “ethnic boundaries”
wherein “Indians remain Indians not by refusing to accept change or to adapt t o
a changing environment, but by selecting out of available choices those alterna-
tives that do not impose a substitute identity” (1973, 10). Maps for these char-
acters become a means of survival, a means of negotiating the unstabl e
boundaries of cultural difference and historical change. Maps conceived in the
context of colonialism, maps of static peoples in a static world, are decisivel y
rejected by Antoine, Son Child, and Doc Edwards in favor of a process o f
dynamic interaction where maps are aids rather than ends .
Even as Russell’s paradox and its literature support a reading of McNickle’s
book, McNickle’s work also can be read back into contemporary Anglo -
American philosophical discussion. 10 On our interpretation, Wind from an Enemy
Sky presents an alternative approach to Russell’s paradox that plays out the impli-
cations of the dominant ways of thinking about the world articulated in Europea n
philosophy and culture. Knowledge, McNickle instructs, can never be fixed or
complete, and knowledge gained from the outside is particularly vulnerable t o
errors that result in violence . The novel also offers a model of an alternative map
of the mind, or, rather, a way of mapping that can provide both a beginning to a
new philosophical investigation of colonialism and recognition of the relevance
of Native American thought to contemporary philosophical discourse . Wind from
an Enemy Sky carries important lessons for anticolonial movements as well .
Through the character of Bull, McNickle demonstrates the dangers of relying
exclusively on tradition and retreating from the modern world . Native cultural
survival, he argues, relies on adapting to changing circumstances without assim -
ilating into the colonizing society . Like Son Child and Antoine, those who wis h
to survive clashing cultures must learn to negotiate contending worlds . The only
alternative, he insists, is catastrophe .
Notes
1 . McNickle (1904–77) numbers among the most prominent political and literary figures of the
twentieth century. A cofounder of the pan-tribal National Congress of American Indians, membe r
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) under John Collier during the reformist 1930s, and lifelong
activist, McNickle left a substantial mark on Native politics—past and present . In addition, his lit-
erary talents remain unsurpassed by the most accomplished and widely read Native writers . The
author of three remarkable novels (the first of which, The Surrounded, was pub lished in 1936), a
handful of short stories, three works of history, and a biography, McNickle painted complex por-
traits of contemporary Native life beleaguered by colonial officials (both ill -willed and well-mean-
ing) who wrest self-determination and, consequently, dignity and hope from their subjects . For
informati on on his li fe, see The Legacy of D’Arcy McNickle (Purdy 1996) and Singing an Indian
Song (Parker 1992) .
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2. McNickle began writing Wind fro m an Enemy Sky in the 1930s, but the novel was published
in 1978, shortly after the author’s death .
3. See Meek (1976) and Sheehan (1974) for discussions of the role of the “stage theory” of
human development in science and governmental policy .
4. By the beginning of the twentieth century, efforts by Giuseppe Peano and others to axioma-
tize arithmatic provided the starting point for the more ambitious efforts of Russell and Whitehead
to axiomatize all of mathematics in terms of mathematical logic . Despite the implications of
Russell’s paradox, philosophers (especially the influential philosophers of the Vienna Circle )
embraced the idea that increasingly complete knowledge of the world could be achieved from a n
observer’s perspective using an axiomatized system, what Frederick Suppe has called “The Receive d
View.” This “Received View” came to dominate the philosophy and practice of science and social
science. See Frederick Suppe’s useful summary of the development and implications of this view in
The Structure ofScientific Theories (1977, 3–232) .
5. This is a rather explicit reference to the work of John Collier, head of the BIA during th e
1930s . McNickle worked for a time at the BIA under Collier’s supervision .
6. Russell originally presented the paradox in The Principles of Mathematics (1903, 101–7) .
7. Quine develops this point in his paper “The Ways of Paradox” (1976a, 10–16) .
8. Russell’s conception strikingly parallels developments in early twentieth-century anthropol-
ogy. Boas’s commitment to cultural relativism eschewed the universalizing tendencies of Morgan’s
theories of social evolution, until then the dominant school of thought about the relations betwee n
cultures. At the same time, Boas’s tendency to examine cultures in isolation and to relegate “prim-
itive” cultures to the historical past articulated the colonial authority of the ethnographer while i t
obfuscated contemporary political relations between societies . In effect, while Boas rejected a uni-
versal perspective, he nevertheless maintained the possibility and value of mapping Native people s
from the outside . See, for example, Boas, Race, Language, and Culture (1940), and Morgan, Ancien t
Society, or Researches into the Lines of Human Prog re ss from Savagery through Barbarism throug h
Civilization (n.d., [1877]).
9. See McNickle’s discussion of the Rough Rock school in Native American Tribalism (1973 ,
chap. 7) .
10. The connection between McNickle’s narrative and the limitations of European and European
American logic is clarified by Dewey in his 1938 critique of Anglo-American logic entitled Logic:
The Theory of Inquiry . Replying directly to Russell’s paradox, Dewey argues that the paradox is gen-
erated when the character of concrete mapping is set aside . The contradiction alleged to exist, Dewe y
says, arises only when the existential and the conceptual are confusedly identified (1938, 362) . The
problem emerges for logicians when they forget the lived experiences out of which ways of think-
ing arise . When experience and theory are rejoined, mapping can be seen as part of the pursuit of
desired ends . From this perspective, maps are no longer more or less successful efforts to describ e
the world completely, but more or less successful efforts to engage the world . On the functional
interpretation, Dewey concludes, any map in any system is valid if its operational use produces th e
consequences that are intended to be served by the map (399) . Recalling McNickle’s narrative,
Dewey’s conclusion cuts two ways. On one hand, the alternative approach to mapping provides a
flexible resource in service of the goal of Native cultural survival . It identifies the features of the ter-
ritory necessary to avoid the dangerous places, to locate food and water, and to find shelter. On the
other hand, it is a critical tool that can challenge colonial power by uncovering its ends and tracin g
the connections between maps and cultural destruction . In the end, by narrative, McNickle goe s
beyond the formal response by Dewey and provides both a critique of the logic at work and an illus -
tration of the concrete implications of colonial maps on the lives of Native people . From the per-
spective of our discussion, once the connection is recognized, Russell’s paradox becomes a valuabl e
locus of investigation where philosophers can reconnect abstract reflection to the living issues o f
colonialism and cultural survival .
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